Ιδρυματικό Αποθετήριο
Πολυτεχνείο Κρήτης
Πολυτεχνείο Κρήτης
EN
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| URI: | http://purl.tuc.gr/dl/dias/73893A59-F400-4080-AEF0-B7C4503EF355 | ||
| Έτος | 2021 | ||
| Τύπος | Πλήρης Δημοσίευση σε Συνέδριο | ||
| Άδεια Χρήσης |
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| Βιβλιογραφική Αναφορά | G. Christou, G. Vasiliadis, E. Athanasopoulos and S. Ioannidis, "Hard edges: hardware-based Control-Flow Integrity for embedded devices," in Embedded Computer Systems: Architectures, Modeling, and Simulation, vol. 13227, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, A. Orailoglu, M. Jung, M. Reichenbach, Eds., Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2022, pp. 275–287. doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-04580-6_18 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-04580-6_18 | ||
| Εμφανίζεται στις Συλλογές |
Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) is a popular technique to defend against State-of-the-Art exploits, by ensuring that every (indirect) control-flow transfer points to a legitimate address and it is part of the Control-flow Graph (CFG) of a program. Enabling CFI in real systems is not straightforward, since in many cases the actual CFG of a program can only be approximated. Even in the case where there is perfect knowledge of the CFG, ensuring that all return instructions will return to their actual call sites, without employing a shadow stack, is questionable.In this work, we explore the implementation of a full-featured CFI-enabled Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) on actual hardware. Our new instructions provide the finest possible granularity for both intra-function and inter-function Control-Flow Integrity. We implement hardware-based CFI (HCFI) by modifying a SPARC SoC and evaluate the prototype on an FPGA board by running SPECInt benchmarks instrumented with a fine-grained CFI policy. HCFI can effectively protect applications from code-reuse attacks, while adding less than 1% average runtime and 2% power consumption overhead, making it particularly suitable for embedded systems.
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