Institutional Repository
Technical University of Crete
Technical University of Crete
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| URI: | http://purl.tuc.gr/dl/dias/79DC6612-3D21-4D5A-9E15-AE6B4FE093ED | ||
| Year | 2012 | ||
| Type of Item | Conference Full Paper | ||
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| Bibliographic Citation | G. Chalkiadakis, E.Elkind , N. R. Jennings.(2012).Simple Coalitional Games with Beliefs .Presented at the 21st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI) ,Pasadena, USA.[online].Available : http://www.intelligence.tuc.gr/~gehalk/Papers/scgbels.pdf | ||
| Appears in Collections |
We introduce coalitional games with beliefs (CGBs), a natural generalization of coalitional games to environ- ments where agents possess private beliefs regarding the capabilities (or types) of others. We put forward a model to capture such agent-type uncertainty, and study coali- tional stability in this setting. Specifically, we introduce a notion of the core for CGBs, both with and without coali- tion structures. For simple games without coalition struc- tures, we then provide a characterization of the core that matches the one for the full information case, and use it to derive a polynomial-time algorithm to check core non- emptiness. In contrast, we demonstrate that in games with coalition structures allowing beliefs increases the computational complexity of stability-related problems. In doing so, we introduce and analyze weighted voting games with beliefs, which may be of independent inter- est. Finally, we discuss connections between our model and other classes of coalitional games.
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