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The power of sequential single-item auctions for agent coordination

Koenig, S., Tovey, C., Lagoudakis Michael, Markakis, V., Kempee, D., Keskinocak, Pınar, Kleyweg, A., Meyerson,A., Jain, S.

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URI: http://purl.tuc.gr/dl/dias/DADFB8A6-36E2-4CBB-8B5F-01BC72C472D5
Έτος 2006
Τύπος Πλήρης Δημοσίευση σε Συνέδριο
Άδεια Χρήσης
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Βιβλιογραφική Αναφορά S.Koenig, C.Tovey, M.G. Lagoudakis, V.Markakis, D.Kempee, P.Keskinocak, A.Kleywegt, A.Meyerson, and S.Jain. (2006 July). The power of sequential single-item auctions for agent coordination.[Online]. Available: http://www.aaai.org/Papers/AAAI/2006/AAAI06-266.pdf
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Περίληψη

Teams of robots are more fault tolerant than singlerobots, and auctions appear to be promising means forcoordinating them. In a recent paper at “Robotics: Scienceand Systems 2005,” we analyzed a coordinationsystem based on sequential single-item auctions. Weshowed that the coordination system is simple to implementand computation and communication efficient,and that the resulting sum of all travel distances inknown terrain is guaranteed to be only a constant factoraway from optimum. In this paper, we put these resultsin perspective by comparing our coordination systemagainst those based on either parallel single-itemauctions or combinatorial auctions, demonstrating thatit combines the advantages of both

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